This paper considers a problem of multi-period supply portfolio selection and execution with demand information updates. A supply portfolio specifies a buyer's decision on selecting sourcing mix from among a group of suppliers. We develop a framework for optimal supply portfolio selection and execution. Further, we demonstrate that the optimal portfolio selection follows a base-stock policy and the option execution follows a modified base-stock policy. We also develop the structural properties of the optimal policy with respect to option contracts and inventories.
Introduction
It has been well demonstrated that imperfect demand information influences buyer's decision about order quantities and a supplier's decision about production plans, especially when supply lead-time is significantly large. To facilitate the tradeoff between the supply lead-time and im-perfect demand information, various forms of supply contracts exist. A supply contract provides flexibility to the buyer and early demand information to the supplier. However, the management of supply contracts is a challenging task to buyers, especially when the buyer has a number of supply contracts from which to choose. A supplier mix, i.e., purchase levels from different suppliers, is a supply portfolio to a buyer.
In this paper, we study option contracts. An option contract requires the early reservation of capacities, thus allowing the buyer to decide the exact purchase amount at a later time when an up to date demand information becomes available. We assume that the buyer has multiple suppliers from which to choose. At the same time, suppliers who are more flexible provide contracts with lower reservation prices and higher execution prices. In contrast, suppliers who are less flexible offer contracts with higher reservation prices and lower execution prices. Therefore, the buyer needs to reserve capacities from individual suppliers, known as the supply portfolio selection, and needs to decide the exact amounts to purchase from individual suppliers, which is known as supply portfolio execution.
Martinez-de-Albeniz and Simchi- Levi (2003) study the problem of supply portfolio selection and execution, where selection is made once at the beginning of the planning horizon. The same portfolio applies to the entire planning horizon, and the option execution happens at the end of each period when the demand becomes known. In this paper, we allow the buyer to select a unique portfolio for each period, and the option execution occurs before the demand becomes known.
There is a large body of literature on supply contracts. Eppen and Iyer (1997) study the "Backup Agreement" in fashion buying. Brown and Lee (2003) model the "Take-or-Pay" capacity reservation contract that is used in the semiconductor industry. Li and Kouvelis (1999) study a time-flexible contract that allows the firm to specify the purchase amount over a given period of time to meet deterministic demand. Tsay (1999) considers a quantity-flexible contract that couples the customer's commitment to purchase no less than a certain percentage. Cachon and Lariviere (2001) focus on the issue of information sharing in a supply chain using an option contract. For supply contract management, Cachon (2003) provides an excellent survey: we refer interested readers to this survey article and the references therein.
Another line of research is supply chain decisions with demand information updates. Iyer and Bergen (1997) study how a manufacturerretailer channel affects the choice of production and marketing variables under a Quick-Response program. They analyze how the demand variance influences the total profit of the retailer. Donohue (2000) develops an information update model with two production modes: the more expensive production mode requires less production lead-time. BarnesSchuster, Bassok and Anupindi (2002) develop a general model that involves two production modes together with one option contract and two-period demand. Sethi, Yan and Zhang (2004) study models with quantity flexible contracts which involves information updates and spot markets. Zhu and Thonemann (2004) study the benefits of sharing future demand information in a model with one retailer and multiple customers. A recent book by Sethi, Yan and Zhang (2005) provides an up to date review of models in inventory decisions with multiple delivery modes and demand information updates.
In this paper, we study a model of multi-period supply portfolio selection and execution with demand information updates. We characterize the portfolio selection and execution policies at the beginning and near the end of each period, respectively. We demonstrate that the portfolio selection follows a base-stock policy and the portfolio execution follows a modified base-stock policy.
In the next section, we introduce the notation and problem formulation. We develop the optimal policies of portfolio selection and option execution in Section 3. Concluding remarks are provided and future research directions are summarized in Section 4.
The Problem Formulation and Notations
In this section, we consider the problem of optimal supply portfolio selection and execution, where a buyer makes reservation and execution decisions with the initial and updated demand information. The sequence of this supplier portfolio selection and execution can be described as follows. At the beginning of each period, each supplier first presents the buyer with an option menu that indicates a unit reservation and execution price. Based on the demand information available at that time, the buyer makes a decision on how many units of the product to reserve from each supplier, which is known as the portfolio selection. Before the customer demand is realized, the buyer revisits the reservation plan with the updated demand information, and decides the exact amount to be purchased from each supplier, which is known as the option execution. Finally, the customer demand is realized, the unsatisfied customer demand is lost, and extra products are inventoried. The sequence of events and decisions are graphically illustrated in Figure 1 .1. We first list the notation that is used in this paper.
T : length of the planning horizon t: period index n: number of available contracts for period t x t : reserved capacities for period t, x t = (x 1 (t), · · · , x n (t)) q t : amount of option exercised, q t = (q 1 (t), · · · , q n (t)) I t : demand information with a cumulative distribution function F (·), and density distribution function f (·) 
, where v i (t) represents the unit reservation price for option i in period t v j (t), we conclude that contract i dominates contract j, because w i (t) < w j (t).
With the above notation and preliminary analysis, we start to write the dynamic programming equations. Note that the inventory dynamics can be written as
The remaining inventory of last period is salvaged as:
The Optimal Portfolio Selection and Execution
To optimize the objective function of Equation (1.1), it is necessary to choose decision variables x t and q t for each t. Let us sketch the plan for the optimal portfolio selection and execution. We first assume that π * 1 (t + 1, β(t + 1)) is concave in β(t + 1), and
and
With these assumptions, we prove that π 2 (q t ; t, x t |i) is concave in q k (t), for q j (t), j = k. For any given x t and the demand information i, we choose q * t (x t , i) to maximize π 2 (q t ; t, x t |i). We then substitute q * t (x t , i) into π 1 (x t ; t, β(t)|I t ) of Equation (1.1) and demonstrate that π 1 (x t ; t, β(t)|I t )) is concave in x t for any initial inventory β(t). The next step is to determine portfolio x * t (β(t)) that maximizes π 1 (x t ; t, β(t)|I t ). Finally, we substitute x * t (β(t)) into π * 1 (t, β(t)) in Equation (1.1) and prove that π * 1 (t, β(t)) is indeed concave in β(t) and
We start by presenting our first result in the following lemma: its proof is included in Appendix.
We now develop the optimal option execution policy q * t for the given reserved capacity x t with the updated demand information i. First, we present the following lemma.
Proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix. Remark 3.1 Lemma 3.2 indicates that we can rank option contracts based on the execution cost. For such a list, a contract becomes active only if its preceding contract has been exhausted. In other words, if
With Lemma 3.2, it is also possible for us to construct an algorithm to find the optimal option execution policy. We start from the contract with cheapest execution price to determine q 1 (t). Then, it follows by determining q 2 (t). After figuring out q *
and execute option contract K + 1 for q * k+1 (t), if k + 1 ≤ n. To facilitate this procedure of finding q * t , let us define a base-stock level for contract k, 
We now demonstrate how q * 1 (t) can be determined. Let
Therefore, we choose q * 1 (t) with the constraint of q 1 t ≤ x 1 (t). To simplify the exposition, we use π 2 (q t ; t) for π 2 (q t ; t, x t , i) whenever there is no confusion. Rewrite Equation (1.2) as
With this expression and Lemma 3.1, we obtain the following lemma, which is required for proving Lemma 3.3. Proof of this lemma can be found in Appendix.
With Definition 3.1, and Equation (1.5), the optimal execution of the supply contract 1 is
We now move to determine q * 2 (t). If q * 1 (t) = x 1 (t), then let q 2 (t) be the next decision variable. By Lemma 3.1, we know that π 2 (x 1 (t), q 2 (t), · · · , 0; t) is concave in q 2 (t). Similarly we obtain
(1.7)
By Definition 3.1, Q 2 (i) satisfies
(1.8)
The optimal option execution of supply contract 2 is
Following the same procedure, we can obtain the optimal option execution for other supply contracts. We summarize the optimal option execution process in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.5 The optimal option execution (l = 1, · · · , n) is:
The process of determining the optimal option execution is illustrated in Fig. 1 .2.
To this end, we have solved the problem of option execution, and we are ready to deal with the problem of portfolio selection. Note that the portfolio selection problem involves an expectation over the demand information signal I. It would simplify the optimization process if we could connect the optimal option execution with the demand information signal. In what follows, we explore the relationship of the option execution and the demand information. We demonstrate that there is a one-to-one mapping between the order quantity on individual contracts and information intervals. To do that, we need to connect the option execution to the demand process. We assume that the demand is stochastically increasing, i.e.
(1.9) Now, we define the critical demand information signals.
Definition 3.2 Define the critical information values
. . .
The option execution policy q * t of period t is as follows. Theorem 3.1 Given the initial inventory β(t) and reserved capacity x * t , the option execution depends on the updated demand information I t = i. Specifically, it follows the modified base-stock policy that is illustrated in Table 1 .1.
Proof. From Equation (1.9), we know that as the information i increases, the thresholds become larger and move to the righthand side of Fig. 1.2 . Hence, the result is straightforward from the Definition 3.2 and Lemma 3.5.
With Theorem 3.1, we are ready to deal with proving the concavity of π 1 (x t ; t, β(t)|I t ) with respect to x t . We summarize our result in the following lemma, the proof of which appears in Appendix.
Lemma 3.6 Given initial inventory β(t), π 1 (x t ; t, β(t)|I t ) is concave in x t .
To this end, we have demonstrated that for a given β(t) with respect to x t , π 1 (x t ; t, β(t)|I t ) is concave in the feasible region of the polyhedral 
cone of nonempty interiors. This fact implies that K-K-T conditions are necessary and sufficient at optimality (Dimitri P. Bertsekas, (1995)). The portfolio selection x * t can be found by using K-K-T conditions. Define the associate Lagrangian multiplier µ j for each constraint
If there are multiple values for y j (t), j = 1, · · · , n, then choose the smallest one.
To obtain x * t , the following lemmas provide us with an algorithmic procedure. Proofs of Lemmas 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 can be found in Appendix.
Lemma 3.7 There exist unique y n (t), · · · , y 2 (t), y 1 (t). Moreover, y i (t) can be found one by one in the order of y n (t), · · · , y 2 (t), y 1 (t).
With the above lemmas, we now develop an algorithm in determining the optimal x * t . If y n (t) ≤ β(t), then by Lemma 3.9, x * t = 0. Else go to the next step.
If y n−1 (t) ≤ β(t), then by Lemma 3.9, x * n−1 (t) = x * n−2 (t) = · · · = x * 1 (t) = 0, and then x * n (t) = y n (t) − β(t). Else if y n−1 (t) > β(t) and y n−1 (t) ≥ y n (t), then by Lemma 3.8, x * n−1 (t) = 0, contract n − 1 is inferior and go to the next step. Else if y n−1 (t) > β(t) and y n−1 (t) < y n (t), then y n−1 (t) = β(t) + x * 1 (t) + · · · + x * n−1 (t), x * n (t) = y n (t) − y n−1 (t) and go to the next step.
Else if y 1 (t) > β(t) and y 1 (t) ≥ y 2 (t), then by Lemma 3.8, x * 1 (t) = 0, contract 1 is inferior.
Else if y 1 (t) > β(t) and y 1 (t) < y 2 (t), then x * 1 (t) = y 1 (t) − β(t), x * 2 (t) = y 2 (t) − y 1 (t). It can be seen from the above procedure that if y j (t) ≤ y j−1 (t), then x * j−1 (t) = 0, which is indifferent to the inventory level β(t). Note that such a contract is known as an inferior contract. To simplify our procedure for finding x * t , we remove all inferior contracts from further consideration. Hence, without loss of generality, we have the following assumption.
ym−2(t) ym−1(t) ym(t) xm(t) xm−1(t)

Initial inventory β(t) y2(t) y1(t)
0
Inventory level ym−3(t)
Other contracts
Not in use
xm−2(t) Figure 1 .3. A demonstration of the optimal supply portfolio selection
Theorem 3.2 (i)After eliminating all inferior contracts, for an initial inventory β(t) the portfolio selection follows a base-stock policy. Specifically, if β(t) > y m (t)
, then x * t = 0. Otherwise, we can find 1 ≤ k ≤ n such that y k−1 (t) ≤ β(t) < y k (t), (y 0 (t) = 0).
(ii)The base-stock levels y 1 (t), · · · , y m (t) are defined by Definition 3.3.
Proof. From the above procedure for finding x * t , we know that the optimal portfolio selection x * t follows the base-stock policy as illustrated in the first part of the theorem.
It is easy to see that the left-hand side of Equation (1.A.12) decreases as v n (t) or w n (t) increases. By Definition 3.3 and Lemma 3.6, the lefthand side of Equation (1.A.12) decreases as y n (t) is increasing. Hence, y n (t) is decreasing in v n (t) or w n (t). Proof for y j (t), j = n − 1, · · · , 1 can be developed similarly.
We now use Fig 1. 3 to illustrate the procedure of the optimal supply portfolio selection. Based on Definition 3.3 and Lemma 3.7, it is possible for us to calculate y i (t), i = 0, · · · , m. Note that y i (t) is independent of β(t). As y i (t) > y i−1 (t), Figure 1 .3 depicts y i (t) as different levels or known as base-stock levels on the left side, and the inventory level β(t) as a dashed line. If there is a y i (t), such that y i (t) ≥ β(t), all contracts i, i + 1, · · · , m are active. For j > i the distance between y j+1 (t) and y j (t) represents the capacity selected for contract j + 1. The distance between y i (t) and β(t) is the capacity selected for contract i.
This result demonstrates that the selection process starts from the most flexible contracts. The less flexible suppliers are used only when the initial inventory is very low.
The follow lemmas show the concavity of π * 1 (t, β(t)) in β(t), and their proofs appear in Appendix.
To this end, we complete the mathematical backward induction proof except for the last period.
When t = T , we use +s instead of −h t and remove the last term of απ * 1 (t + 1, (β(t) + · · · + q n (t) − D t ) + ) in the Equation (1.2). Then, in the same manner, it is straightforward to prove that π * 1 (t, β(t)) is concave in β(T ), ∀β(T ) ≥ 0 and
Conclusions and Research Directions
In this paper, we develop a model for supply portfolio selection and execution. We demonstrate the existence of an optimal selection and execution policy, and show that the selection process starts with the most flexible suppliers, and the execution process starts from the most less flexible suppliers.
It is worth noting that we only consider the decision process of the option contract selection and execution. The problem of designing the contract, which is the task on the supplier side, remains unsolved. In particular, the reservation and execution prices are treated as input parameters. How a supplier determines these prices remains an open question. These areas may be fruitful research directions in the future. 
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.1. First, fixing other qj(t), j = k, let
Hence by Equation (1.2), π2(qt; t, xt|i) = ED t (gt(q k (t))). As Dt is independent of q k (t), the concavity in q k (t) can be preserved after the expectation in Dt. Then we only need to show that gt(q k (t)) is concave in q k (t), given qj(t), j = k.
, and
. Recalling the supposition we know that
is non-increasing in q k (t) and
is non-increasing in q k (t). Additionally, when
Recall Assumption 3.1, which guarantees that rt − w k (t) ≥ −w k (t) − ht + α(v1(t + 1) + w1(t + 1)), i.e. at the joint point of two cases, i.e. when q k (t) = Dt − P j =k q k (t), the left-hand derivative is no less than the right-hand derivative. Hence, gt(q k (t)) is concave in q k (t). The lemma is proved to be true.
Proof of Lemma 3.2 Given q *
since w k (t) < wj(t) (Assumption 2.1). Hence we obtain 8 < :
Recall that (q k (t), qj(t)) appears in Equation (1.2) in terms of −w k (t)q k (t)−wj(t)qj(t) and q k (t) + qj(t), and Dt is independently distributed from q k (t) and qj(t) so that the expectation preserves the order of preference. Hence, to maximize Equation (1.2), it is better to choose (
Proof of Lemma 3.3. Let Q k (i), k = 1, 2, · · · , n be the least solution to the following equation of u:
Let us show that Equation (1.A.2) always has solutions so that Q k (i) is well defined for all k. First of all, by Lemma 3.4 the left-hand side of this equation is non-increasing in u. Secondly, when u = 0, the demand cumulative distribution function H(u | i) = 0. Then, the left-hand side is
Thirdly, when u → +∞, the demand cumulative distribution function H(u | i) = 1. Then, the left-hand side of the above equation is
The first inequality is by
| β(t+1)=+∞ < 0, which is assumed at the beginning of Section 3. Hence, there is at least one real number u that satisfies Equation (1.A.2). By the last sentence of Definition 3.1, Q k (i) is unique.
As w k (t) < w k+1 t (Assumption 2.1) and by Lemma 3.4 the left-hand side of Equa-
(1.A.4)
Proof of Lemma 3.4. By Lemma 3.1, i.e. the concavity of π2(q1(t), 0, · · · , 0; t) in q1(t),
is non-increasing in q1(t). Comparing the positions of q1(t) and β(t) appearing in Equation (1.5), we know that given a specific q1(t), (rt − w1(t) 
Proof of Lemma 3.6. According to Theorem 3.1, rewrite Equation (1.1) as follows.
π1(xt; t, β(t)|It) = −v1(t)x1(t) − v2(t)x2(t) − · · · − vn(t)xn(t) +
(1.A.5)
(1.A.7)
Rewriting Equation (1.2) as
(1.A.8)
we then obtain
π1(xt; t, β(t)|It) = −v1(t)x1(t) − v2(t)x2(t) − · · · − vn(t)xn(t)
(1.A.9)
Take the partial derivatives with respect to x1 (t), x2(t), · · · , xn(t) .
(1.A.10)
The last equality holds by the definitions (see Definition 3.2) of Q k (i) when the information i =î k−1 , i k respectively. Similarly,
(1.A.12)
To ascertain whether it is concave in the xt, a vector, we need to obtain the secondorder derivatives as follows: 
